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A Review Of The Proposed
Michigan Rules Of Evidence
By James K. Robinson and John W. Reed
INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 1977, the Supreme Court of Michigan entered an order stating that
it is considering adoption of the proposed Michigan Rules of Evidence which were
submitted to the Court by the committee which it appointed in March 1975. The Court
has solicited comments from interested persons regarding the proposed rules. A
copy of the Supreme Court's order is published in this issue of the Bar Journal. The
proposed rules are published in the January 26, 1977, issue of North Western Re-
porter, Second Series (Michigan Edition). The purpose of this article is to review in
general the background and substance of the proposed rules. More detailed informa-
tion concerning the rules may be obtained by consulting the text of the rules and the
committee notes thereto.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the policy considerations
supporting adoption of each proposed rule which conflicts with prior Michigan law.
For the most part the proposed rules are identical with the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the policy considerations favoring adoption of the rules are discussed in the
Federal Advisory Committee Notes and the legislative history of the Federal Rules.
EVIDENCE LAW
REFORM GENERALLY
The first major effort to reform the
law of evidence was undertaken by the
American Law Institute in 1939. The
product of that effort was the publica-
tion of the Model Code of Evidence in
1942. At that time Professor Morgan,
in his foreword to the Model Code,
said:
"[Tlhe rules of evidence have become
so complicated as to invite compari-
son with equity pleading, of which
Story wrote that the ability to under-
stand and apply them 'requires vari-
ous talents, vast learning, and a
clearness and acuteness of percep-
tion, which belong only to very gifted
minds' ... It is time ... for radical
reformation of the law of evidence."
Morgan, Foreword, American Law
Institute, Model Code of Evidence 5
(1942).
The Model Code achieved little suc-
cess in reforming the law of evidence.
In 1953 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws published the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, which substantially revised
the Model Code. Although the Uni-
form Rules were well received by
judges, lawyers and law professors, the
rules were enacted only by the Virgin
Islands. In 1965 the California Legis-
lature enacted the California Evidence
Code. The California Code is based
upon the Uniform Rules; however, the
legislature modified them to comply
with California policy and practice. In
1967, the New Jersey Supreme Court
promulgated a modified version of the
Uniform Rules.
In 1965 the United States Supreme
Court appointed a committee to formu-
late rules of evidence for the federal
courts. The Federal Rules of Evidence
were enacted by Congress and became
effective July 1, 1975. At this writing
at least six states have adopted rules
of evidence patterned after the Federal
Rules. These states are Wisconsin,
Nevada, New Mexico, Nebraska, Maine
and Arkansas. A number of other
states are in the process of consider-
ing adoption of evidence rules similar
to the Federal Rules.
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For a more detailed discussion of the
background of evidence law reform,
including the background of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, see Spangen-
berg, The Federal Rules of Evidence -
An Attempt at Uniformity in Federal
Courts, 15 Wayne L Rev 1061 (1969);
Hungate, An Introduction to the Pro-
posed Rules ofEvidence, 32 Fed B J 225
(1973); Berger, An Introduction to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 Litigation
No. 1, p 8 (Fall 1975).
EVIDENCE LAW REFORM
IN MICHIGAN
The prospect of imminent adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence
prompted the Board of Commissioners
of the State Bar of Michigan to ap-
point a special committee in 1974 to
consider the feasibility of adopting
rules of evidence for Michigan. The
special committee issued a report en-
dorsing "the concept of a Michigan
evidence code which adheres to the
federal rules of evidence except where
particular state considerations require
deviation." In support of its conclu-
sion, the special committee quoted
from the report of the California Law
Revision Commission recommending
codification of California evidence law:
"In few, if any, areas of the law is
there as great a need for immediate
and accurate information as there is
in the law of evidence. On most legal
questions, the judge or lawyer has
time to research the law before it is
applied. But questions involving the
admissibility of evidence arise sud-
denly during trial. Proper objections
- stating the correct grounds -
must be made immediately or the
lawyer may find that his objection
has been waived. The judge must
rule immediately in order that the
trial may progress in an orderly fash-
ion. Frequently, evidence questions
cannot be anticipated and, hence,
necessary research often cannot be
done beforehand.
There is, therefore, an acute need for
a systematic, comprehensive, and au-
thoritative statement of the law of
evidence that is easy to use and con-
venient for immediate reference."
West's California Evidence Code
XXIII (1968).
The State Bar Board of Commis-
sioners adopted a resolution in De-
cember 1974 endorsing the report of
its special evidence committee. See
Report of the State Bar Special Com-
mittee on Uniform Rules of Evidence,
53 Mich State B J 765 (1974). On
March 19, 1975, the Supreme Court of
Michigan issued an order constituting
and appointing a committee to prepare
JamesK.
James K. Robinson is Chairman and John W. Reed is Report-
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proposed Michigan Rules of Evidence.
See Robinson, The Impact of Federal
Rules of Evidence on Michigan Evi-
dence Law, 54 Mich State B J 193
(1975). The committee consisted of
representatives from the Judiciary,
the Legislature and the State Bar.
Persons serving on the committee had
diversified backgrounds and virtually
every segment of the legal community
was well represented.
HOW THE PROPOSED RULES
WERE DRAFTED
The manner in which the Supreme
Court Evidence Committee prepared
its proposed rules is described in the
Prologue to the rules:
"At [its first] meeting the Committee
unanimously agreed that it would
draft Michigan Rules of Evidence
generally patterned on the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Thereafter, the
Committee proceeded to consider
proposed rules of evidence using the
outline of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence as the agenda for the Commit-
tee's work.
"Before each meeting an agenda was
established and circulated to Com-
mittee members setting the proposed
rules to be considered at the Com-
mittee's next meeting. Ih addition,
before each meeting, legal memo-
randa were forwarded to Commit-
tee members discussing the impact
on Michigan law which would occur
through adoption of the proposed
rules ...
"At the Committee's meetings the
rules were taken up in the order set
out in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
After discussion of a proposed rule
and its impact on existing Michigan
law, motions were entertained to
adopt a form of the rule under con-
sideration. These motions were dis-
cussed and thereafter voted on by
the Committee. At the conclusion of
the Committee's adoption of a full set
of proposed counterpart rules to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, one meet-
ing ... was devoted to a review of all
rules previously adopted to deter-
mine whether changes in specific
rules should be made by the Commit-
tee in light of the entire set of rules
adopted. A number of changes were
made at that meeting.
"Thereafter, the Chairman and Re-
porter prepared a draft of committee
notes. This draft was circulated for
review by the Committee, together
with several proposed technical
changes in the rules. At its [last]
meeting ... the Committee approved
the final draft of the Proposed
Michigan Rules of Evidence with
Committee Notes. At this meeting the
Committee authorized the Chairman
and Reporter to make all necessary
changes in the proposed rules and
committee notes and at the earliest
possible date thereafter to submit the
draft to the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan for its consideration. The Com-
mittee directed the Chairman and
Reporter to communicate to the
Court that the Committee recom-
mends that these proposed Michigan
Rules of Evidence be adopted by the
Court." Prologue, Proposed Michi-
gan Rules of Evidence.
The source and format of the pro-
posed rules are described in the Com-
mittee's General Comment:
"The Michigan Rules of Evidence are
drawn in large part from the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which took effect
July 1, 1975. The Committee Note fol-
lowing each Michigan rule indicates
its source. When that source is the
corresponding federal rule, the
Michigan Committee Note usually
does not restate the rule's back-
ground or comment on its meaning.
Rather the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Notes and Congressional re-
ports are allowed to speak for them-
selves. The few exceptions, in which
there are 'Committee Comments,' are
instances in which the Michigan
Committee doubts or disagrees with
views suggested in the federal pre-
enactment materials, or in which the
Committee has devised a variant rule.
"The Committee's statements regard-
ing 'Impact on Prior Michigan Law'
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merely indicate the Committee's per-
ceptions of the correspondence, or
lack of it, between the rules and
prior Michigan law. Prepared as an
aid to Bench and Bar in the transi-
tion from prior Michigan law to these
rules, these statements are descrip-
tive only, and not prescriptive. They
are not to be carried forward as a
gloss on the new rules." General
Comment, Proposed Michigan Rules
of Evidence.
The proposed Michigan Rules of
Evidence were submitted to the Su-
preme Court in January 1977 and
simultaneously published for comment
in the North Western Reporter, Sec-
ond Series (Michigan Edition) pur-
suant to the Court's January 6, 1977,
order which is published in this issue
of the Bar Journal.
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION
OF THE MRE
As stated in the General Comment
to the proposed Michigan Rules of
Evidence (MRE), the proposed rules
are drawn in large part from the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. A major differ-
ence in approach exists between the
method of adopting the Federal Rules
and the method contemplated for
adopting the Michigan Rules. The
Federal Rules were enacted by Con-
gress. The Michigan Rules will be
adopted by the Supreme Court of
Michigan. Adoption of the rules by the
Court rather than enactment by the
Legislature is consistent with the
Michigan Supreme Court's view of the
power committed to it by the Michigan
Constitution. In Perin v Peuler, 373
Mich 531, 541 (1964), the Court said:
"The function of enacting and
amending judicial rules of practice
and procedure [including the rules of
evidence] has been committed exclu-
sively to this Court (Const 1908, art 7,
§ 5; Const 1963, art 6, § 5); a function
with which the legislature may not
meddle or interfere save as the Court
may acquiesce and adopt for reten-
tion at judicial will." Accord People v
Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 366 (1974).
With only minor changes to conform
the Federal Rules to state use, the
Michigan Rules of Evidence and the
Federal Rules are identical with the
following principal exceptions:
1. MRE 202 (Judicial Notice of Law);
2. MRE 302 (Presumptions in Crimi-
nal Cases);
3. MRE 404 (Character Evidence not
Admissible to Prove Conduct; Ex-
ceptions; Other Crimes);
4. MRE 606 (Competency of Jurors
as Witnesses);
5. MRE 609 (Impeachment by Con-
viction of Crime);
6. MRE 611(b) (Scope of Cross-exam-
ination);
7. MRE 612 (Writing or Object Used
to Refresh Memory);
8. MRE 801(d)(1)(A) (hearsay - prior
inconsistent statements).
The nature of the differences be-
tween the proposed Michigan Rules
and the Federal Rules is such that lit-
tle, if any, damage is done to the ad-
vantage of uniformity between federal
and state evidence law which will be
gained through the adoption of the
proposed Michigan evidence rules.
We shall now briefly describe the
proposed Michigan Rules, noting the
significant differences between them




By virtue of the scope rule, MRE
101, the Michigan Rules of Evidence
govern all proceedings in Michigan
courts with the exception of four kinds
of situations specified in MRE 1101:
determination of preliminary ques-
tions of fact, grand jury proceedings,
summary contempt proceedings, and a
group of miscellaneous proceedings,
e.g., sentencing, and granting or re-
voking probation.
In keeping with the Michigan con-
stitutional concept of judicial suprem-
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acy in matters of practice and proce-
dure (see Perin v Peuler, 373 Mich 531
(1964)), the Michigan Rules of Evi-
dence govern even when there is a
contrary statute (e.g., MRE 601 effec-
tively displaces the Dead Man's Act).
MRE 101, provides, however, that
statutory evidence rules not in conflict
with the Michigan Rules of Evidence
remain in effect (e.g., MRE 501 pre-
serves existing privileges, most of
which are statutory).
As the title suggests, the six rules in
Article I deal with concepts, most of
them orthodox and familiar, applica-
ble to the presenting and receiving of
evidence generally. For example, the
rules are to be construed "to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined" (MRE
102); inadmissible evidence is not to
be suggested to members of the jury by
offers of proof or by improper ques-
tions in their hearing (MRE 103 (c));
harmless error is not ground for rever-
sal (MRE 103 (a)); offers of proof gen-
erally are required (MRE 103(a)(2));
the court must instruct on admissibil-
ity for a limited purpose (MRE 105);
and the traditional rule of "complete-
ness" directs the admission of the re-
mainder of a writing (or another writ-
ing) "which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously" with
the writing already introduced (MRE
106).
MRE 104 clarifies judge and jury
roles in determining questions con-
cerning the qualification of witnesses,
the existence of privileges, and the
admissibility of evidence. Such ques-
tions are generally for the court; and
in determining those questions, the
court is not bound by the rules of evi-
dence except those relating to priv-
ileges. However, when relevancy of
evidence depends on the fulfillment
of a condition of fact, the court is to
admit it "upon, or subject to, the in-
troduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of
the condition."
This scheme is consistent with prior
Michigan law generally, although
there are aberrant holdings. MRE
104(d), however, which provides that
an accused does not, merely by testify-
ing on a preliminary matter, subject
himself to cross-examination as to
other issues in the case, departs from
the holding in People v Johnson, 382
Mich 632, 640 (1969), that a defendant
by taking the stand waives his right to
refuse to answer "any question that
may be material to the case and which
would, in the case of any other wit-
ness, be legitimate cross-examination."
Article II
Judicial Notice
MRE 201 provides an orthodox pat-
tern of judicial notice of "adjudicative
facts," i.e., the facts of the particular
case. In keeping with Michigan and
general authorities, facts are made
judicially noticeable when they are
"either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot rea-
sonably be questioned." MRE 201 sets
forth the procedure for taking judicial
notice, and it makes the judicially
noticed fact conclusive on the jury in a
civil action, but not in a criminal case.
MRE 202, dealing with judicial
notice of law, has no counterpart in
the Federal Rules, it being the posi-
tion of the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee that "the manner in which law is
fed into the judicial process is never a
proper concern of the rules of evidence
but rather of the rules of procedure."
The Michigan Committee concluded
that the convenience of lodging the
judicial notice of law rule adjacent to
the judicial notice of fact rule out-
weighed conceptual concerns; accord-
ingly it drafted MRE 202, patterned
after Rule 9 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence (1953).
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In essence MRE 202 assumes that
the law of the various American juris-
dictions should be treated as domestic
law, subject to judicial notice, a reflec-
tion of the effectiveness of modern
publishing and communication prac-
tices. Private acts, ordinances and
regulations of governmental subdivi-
sions or agencies of Michigan, and the
law of foreign countries are also judi-
cially noticeable, but only if a party so
requests, furnishes the court with
helpful information, and has given ad-
verse parties adequate notice. MRE
202 represents a modest liberalization
of the procedures heretofore estab-




MRE 301 provides that civil pre-
sumptions shift only the burden of
going forward with evidence, and not
the burden of persuasion. In so provid-
ing the rule is identical with the cor-
responding federal rule. Once a pre-
sumption shifts the burden of going
forward with evidence, the party in
whose favor it operates is entitled to a
directed verdict on the issue if the ad-
versary produces no evidence rebut-
ting the presumption. In short, it is a
mandatory inference.
When rebutted the presumption dis-
appears, a development sometimes
termed "the bursting of the bubble."
The implication is not entirely accu-
rate, however, because MRE 301, like
its federal counterpart, permits the
basic facts of a rebutted presumption,
if logically supportive, to serve never-
theless as the basis of an inference and
allows the judge to inform the jury of
that permissible inference.
In all of this, MRE 301 is consistent
with prior Michigan law except for
some cases indicating that one tra-
ditionally strong presumption - that
of undue influence when a fiduciary
benefits from a relationship of trust -
may shift the burden of persuasion.
See e.g., Totorean v Samuels, 52 Mich
App 14 (1974).
MRE 302, dealing with presump-
tions in criminal cases, has no coun-
terpart in the Federal Rules, Congress
having preferred to deal with the sub-
ject in connection with its pending re-
vision of the federal criminal code.
MRE 302, which deals only with pro-
cedural matters and not validity,
makes clear that a criminal presump-
tion is never mandatory, that the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt require-
ment is not affected, and that when
instructing the jury the court should
state that "it may, but need not, infer
the existence" of the presumed fact
from the basic facts. (Emphasis add-
ed.) In all of these matters, MRE 302
is consistent with prior Michigan law.
Article IV
Relevancy and Its Limits
The first three rules of Article IV
deal with relevancy generally, and the
remaining eight deal with particular
applications in areas frequently recur-
ring.
MRE 401 views the issue of rele-
vance as essentially one of logical or
rational relationship between evidence
offered and facts that are "of conse-
quence to the determination of the ac-
tion." The quoted phrase has the same
meaning as the more traditional term,
"material," a term generally avoided
in the federal and proposed Michigan
rules.
The test of relevancy is whether the
evidence has "any tendency" to make
the disputed fact "more probable or
less probable than it would be without
the evidence." On the whole, the rele-
vancy threshold is low and the rule is
generally consistent with prior Michi-
gan law.
MRE 402, essentially a technical
provision, excludes irrelevant evidence
and admits all relevant evidence "ex-
cept as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, the
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Constitution of the State of Michigan,
these rules, or other rules adopted by
the Supreme Court."
Perhaps no provision of the proposed
rules will have a more pervasive effect
than MRE 403, which reads as fol-
lows:
"Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence."
The rule directs a weighing of pro-
bative value against the "costs" of the
evidence in terms of the prejudice, con-
fusion, or waste of time. The rule is
consistent with prior Michigan law.
People v Der Martzex, 390 Mich 410,
415 (1973). However, the scheme of
MRE 401 and 403, which requires
counsel and the court to consider rele-
vancy questions in three steps - first,
testing for probative value; second,
identifying the "costs;" and third,
weighing probative value against
prejudice, etc. - should produce
clearer, wiser and fairer rulings.
MRE 404, the first of eight rules
dealing with relevance questions in
particular settings, adopts the or-
thodox prohibition against the use of a
trait of character to prove that an in-
dividual acted in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion. The rule then
adopts three familiar exceptions: First,
one accused of a crime may offer evi-
dence of his good character, and the
prosecutor may then join the issue and
offer evidence of bad character; second,
the accused may offer evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime, and the prosecutor
may rebut; and third, parties may
offer evidence of the character of a
witness bearing on credibility, as pro-
vided in some detail in MRE 607, 608,
and 609.
MRE 404 differs from its federal
counterpart, however, in excluding
evidence of the character of the victim
of a sexual conduct crime, except for
evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct with the accused and evidence
of specific instances of sexual activity
to show the source or origin of semen,
pregnancy, or disease, and then only if
the court determines that probative
value is not "substantially out-
weighed" by the danger of unfair prej-
udice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury. The rule is thus con-
sonant with Michigan's recently
enacted statute covering sexual con-
duct crimes. See MCLA 750.520j.
MRE 405 identifies the appropriate
methods of proving character. Gener-
ally character may be proved only by
reputation or opinion; but in those
cases in which character is an essen-
tial element of a charge, claim, or de-
fense, proof may also be made of spe-
cific instances of conduct. MRE 405,
which is identical with Federal Rule
405, departs from prior Michigan law
- and common law generally - in
permitting proof of character by opin-
ion as well as by reputation evidence.
MRE 406 follows prior Michigan
law in making admissible evidence of
the habit of a person or the routine
practice of an organization to prove
that the conduct of the person or or-
ganization on a particular occasion
was in conformity with that habit or
routine practice.
MRE 407 follows Michigan prior
practice in making evidence of reme-
dial measures taken after an event in-
admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct. For similar policy
reasons, MRE 408 renders inadmissi-
ble evidence of compromises and offers
to compromise. In one aspect, however,
this latter rule changes prior Michi-
gan law. It states that "Evidence of
conduct or statements made in com-
promise negotiations is likewise not
admissible." Michigan has tradition-
ally admitted factual statements made
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during compromise negotiations, pro-
tecting, for practical purposes, only
express settlement offers and hypo-
thetical statements. Believing the or-
thodox rule a trap for the unwary, and
in any event inconsistent with the gen-
eral purposes of the rule, the Michigan
Committee elected to employ the lan-
guage quoted, which is also contained
in Federal Rule 408.
In yet another protective provision,
MRE 409 makes evidence of paying or
promising to pay medical and similar
expenses inadmissible to prove liabil-
ity for the injury treated.
MRE 410 renders inadmissible
pleas of guilty later withdrawn, pleas
of nolo contendere, offers to plead
guilty or nolo contendere, and state-
ments made in connection with any of
the foregoing pleas or offers. Prior
Michigan cases agree that a plea of
guilty later withdrawn and statements
made in connection therewith are in-
admissible, but they are less clear as
to the admissibility of offers to plead
guilty or nolo contendere. To the ex-
tent that certain prior Michigan cases
may be read to allow evidence of such
offers, they are rejected by MRE 410.
MRE 410 further provides, however,
for the admissibility in perjury cases
of evidence of statements made in
connection with pleas and offers to
plead when made by defendant under
oath, on the record, and in the pres-
ence of counsel. The Michigan Com-
mittee found no Michigan authority
inconsistent with that provision.
Finally, MRE 411 makes evidence
of liability insurance inadmissible to
prove negligence or wrongful conduct.
In the form adopted, however, this
familiar rule does not require the ex-
clusion of such evidence when offered
for another purpose, such as proof of
ownership or control, or the bias of a
witness, and in this regard may
change prior Michigan law which ap-
pears to have prohibited introduction
of liability insurance for all purposes,




In common with the Federal Rules
of Evidence but for somewhat different
reasons, the Michigan Rules of Evi-
dence contain no provisions dealing
with specific privileges. MRE 501
reads as follows:
"The privilege of a witness, person,
government, state, or political subdi-
vision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law ex-
cept as modified by statute or court
rule."
Thus, the rule carries forward prior
Michigan law with respect to privi-
leges, whether common-law in origin,
e.g., the attorney-client privilege, or





"Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided
in these rules."
The United States Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee, commenting on
identical language in its draft, said:
"This general ground-clearing
eliminates all grounds of incompe-
tency not specifically recognized in
the succeeding rules of this Article."
Most of the common-law grounds of
incompetency have long since been
eliminated in Michigan as elsewhere,
e.g., conviction of infamous crime,
interest in the outcome of litigation,
marriage, etc. MRE 601 is inconsis-
tent with prior Michigan law, how-
ever, in eliminating the few grounds
that remain.
Chief among these is the Dead
Man's Act, MCLA 600.2116; GCR
1963, 608. The 1967 amendment to the
Act permitting a party to testify as to
matters "equally within the knowl-
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edge of the person incapable of testify-
ing" if "some material portion of his
testimony is supported by some other
material evidence tending to corrobo-
rate his claim" has had the effect of
diminishing the exclusionary force of
the Act already, particularly because
the cases have required very little cor-
roboration to avoid the statute.
MRE 601 is inconsistent also with
prior Michigan cases suggesting that
determinations of competency to tes-
tify where there are problems of men-
tal or moral qualification are within
the court's discretion. The question of
mental capacity is particularly suited
to the jury as one of weight and credi-
bility, subject to judicial authority to
review the sufficiency of the evidence;
and standards of moral qualifications
are dealt with by the manner of ad-
ministering the oath under MRE 603.
MRE 602 requires the witness to
have personal knowledge of the matter
testified to (except in the case of opin-
ion testimony by expert witnesses),
and MRE 603 requires him to "declare
that he will testify truthfully, by oath
or affirmation administered in the
form calculated to awaken his con-
science and impress his mind with his
duty to do so." In both regards the new
rules effect no change in Michigan
law.
MRE 604 somewhat tightens the
procedure for using interpreters, re-
quiring them to be sworn and to be
qualified as experts.
MRE 605 and 606 render judge and
juror incompetent to testify in the trial
of the case in which they are sitting,
and no apparent change in Michigan
practice is effected thereby.
Federal Rule 606 contains a provi-
sion dealing with whether testimony,
affidavits, or statements of a juror
may be received for the purpose of in-
validating or supporting a verdict or
indictment. MRE 606 contains no
counterpart, the Michigan Committee
having concluded that the question is
one of substantive law rather than of
evidence and that, in any event, the
area is inappropriately governed by an
inflexible rule, being more suitably
subject to case law development.
MRE 607 is the first of three rules
dealing with impeachment of witness-
es. It provides simply that:
"The credibility of a witness may
be attacked by any party, including
the party calling him."
Although inconsistent with the or-
thodox and Michigan view that a wit-
ness' credibility generally may not be
attacked by the party calling him, the
new rule represents a less than star-
tling change because of the numerous
exceptions to the traditional rule. For
example, prior Michigan law recog-
nized the right of a party to impeach
his own witness if the witness was ad-
verse or hostile, if the party was taken
by surprise by the witness' testimony,
if the witness was a res gestae witness
whom the prosecution was obliged to
call, or where the witness' recollection
needed to be refreshed by his prior in-
consistent statements.
MRE 608 provides that the credibil-
ity of a witness may be attacked by evi-
dence of character for untruthfulness
(and, if attacked, supported similarly).
The evidence may be in the form of
reputation, and to that extent the rule is
wholly consistent with prior Michigan
law. The rule provides also, however,
that the evidence may be in the form of
opinion, and to that extent it is inconsis-
tent with prior Michigan law.
MRE 608(b) prohibits extrinsic proof
of specific instances of conduct (other
than convictions) bearing on credibil-
ity, but it permits, in the court's discre-
tion, cross-examination about specific
instances if deemed probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness. Except that
the cases do not clearly limit inquiry to
conduct probative of truthfulness or un-
truthfulness, MRE 608(b) is generally
in accord with prior Michigan law.
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In the sessions of the Michigan Com-
mittee, as in the Congressional hear-
ings, the question of impeachment of a
witness by evidence of conviction of a
crime, covered by MRE 609, generated
more discussion and controversy than
any other rule. The proposed Michigan
rule is identical with its federal coun-
terpart with respect to what might be
called the four auxiliary provisions: (b)
time limit; (c) effect of pardon, annul-
ment, or certificate of rehabilitation;
(d)juvenile adjudications; and (e) pend-
ency of appeal. With respect to the gen-
eral rule stated in subdivision (a), how-
ever, the proposed Michigan rule differs
from the federal equivalent by creating
separate rules, one applicable only to
criminal defendants (MRE 609(a)(1))
and another applicable to all other wit-
nesses (MRE 609(a)(2)).
The heart of MRE 609(a) is a divi-
sion of crimes into two categories
(crimes punishable by death or by im-
prisonment in excess of one year, and
crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement regardless of the punish-
ment), which are then applied some-
what differently to a witness-accused
and to all other witnesses.
With respect to all witnesses, in-
cluding a witness-accused, conviction
of a serious crime (i.e., one punishable
by death or by imprisonment for more
than a year) but not involving dishon-
esty or false statement, may be shown
only if "the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evi-
dence on the issue of credibility out-
weighs its prejudicial effect."
As to the other category of crimes
(those that involve dishonesty or false
statement, without regard to severity
of punishment) a distinction is drawn
between a witness-accused and all
other witnesses. In the case of the
witness-accused, conviction of a crime
involving dishonesty may be admitted,
again, only if the court determines
that probative value outweighs preju-
dicial effect; but as to all other witness-
es, the court has no discretion to ex-
clude evidence of such a conviction for
impeachment purposes. Thus, the prin-
cipal departures from prior Michigan
law are:
1) Misdemeanor convictions are
made admissible to impeach wit-
nesses in criminal cases if the mis-
demeanor involves dishonesty or
false statement and, in the case of a
witness-accused, the court deter-
mines that the conviction is more
probative on the issue of credibility
than unfairly prejudicial. Cf. People v
Renno, 392 Mich 45 (1974) (no mis-
demeanor impeachment in criminal
cases).
2) Misdemeanor convictions are
made admissible to impeach wit-
nesses in civil cases only if the mis-
demeanor involves dishonesty or
false statement. Cf. Sting v Davis, 384
Mich 608 (1971) (traffic misdemean-
ors allowed to impeach driver-
witnesses in automobile negligence
cases).
3) Felony convictions not involving
dishonesty or false statement are
admissible in all types of cases only
if the court determines that proba-
tive value on credibility outweighs
prejudicial effect. Cf. Sting v Davis,
supra (no discretion in a civil case to
deny cross-examination regarding
the driving record of a plaintiff-
driver or a defendant-driver).
MRE 609(b) establishes a presump-
tive "statute of limitations," generally
excluding proof of convictions more
than ten years after release of the
witness from the confinement imposed
for that conviction, a rule somewhat
more precise than but generally in ac-
cord with the principle of People v
Jackson, 391 Mich 323 (1974).
MRE 609(d), though providing for
the general inadmissibility of evidence
of juvenile adjudications, does au-
thorize a court in a criminal case to
admit evidence of a juvenile adjudica-
tion of a witness other than the ac-
cused where such an offense would be
admissible to attack the credibility of
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an adult and the court is "satisfied
that admission in evidence is neces-
sary for a fair determination of the
issue of guilt or innocence."
Although MCLA 712A.23 purports
to bar the use of a juvenile adjudica-
tion "for any purpose whatever," the
Court of Appeals in a series of cases
since 1971 has followed a rule similar
to MRE 609(b). See, e.g., People v
Hawkins, 58 Mich App 69 (1975).
MRE 610, making evidence of re-
ligious beliefs or opinions inadmissible
on credibility, is in accord with prior
Michigan law.
MRE 611, dealing with mode and
order of interrogation and presenta-
tion, has three subdivisions: (a) control
by court; (b) scope of cross-examina-
tion; and (c) leading questions. All
three are consistent with prior Mich-
igan law.
The only controversial question in
the rule is that of scope of cross-
examination. The Federal Rules of
Evidence retained the federal and
majority practice of limiting cross-
examination to the subject matter of
the direct examination and, of course,
matters affecting the credibility of the
witness. MRE 611(b) conforms with
prior Michigan law and adopts the
rule of broad scope, subject to limita-
tion by the judge "in the interests of
justice."
MRE 612 establishes, in some de-
tail, the procedure to be followed when
a writing or object is used to refresh a
witness' memory. In general, it is de-
signed to give an adversary access to
the item that has been used to refresh.
The court may require production of a
writing or object that was used to re-
fresh the memory of the witness even
before he took the stand. Here a mat-
ter of discretion, the requirement may
have been mandatory in prior Michi-
gan practice. See Miles v Clairmont
Transfer Co., 35 Mich App 319 (1971).
MRE 613 deals with prior state-
ments of witnesses. MRE 613(a) re-
jects prior Michigan practice, based on
the rule in "The Queen's Case," re-
quiring a written statement to be
shown to the witness before he is
cross-examined on it. The new rule
eliminates the requirement of a prior
display, providing only that "on re-
quest the same shall be shown or dis-
closed to opposing counsel."
MRE 613(b), relating to extrinsic
evidence of prior inconsistent state-
ments, retains the familiar foundation
requirement but in modified form: it is
sufficient that the witness be afforded
an opportunity to explain or deny the
prior statement and the opposite party
afforded an opportunity to interrogate
him thereon. The opportunity need not
precede proof of the prior statement.
MRE 614 makes explicit the time-
honored power of a court to call wit-
nesses and interrogate them. There
clearly is Michigan authority for the
latter proposition, less clearly for the
former.
MRE 615 requires, with certain ex-
ceptions, the exclusion of witnesses on
request of a party. Michigan cases
have held such exclusion discretionary
with the trial court; the mandatory
exclusion under the rule is to that ex-
tent inconsistent with prior Michigan
law.
Article VII
Opinions and Expert Testimony
The six rules dealing with opinions
and expert testimony are drawn ver-
batim from the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. These rules have been widely
regarded as a significant liberalization
of the rules and procedures governing
such testimony. Viewed in the light of
prior Michigan law, however, they
represent somewhat less change in
this jurisdiction.
MRE 701 (opinion testimony by lay
witnesses) and MRE 702 (testimony
by experts) make the threshold test for
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admissibility of opinion that of "value"
or "helpfulness" or "assistance," rather
than the more restrictive test of
'necessity."
Roughly stated, under the necessity
principle opinion by a lay witness is
admitted only if the witness needs to
employ it in order to communicate
adequately with the trier of fact, and
opinion by an expert is admissible
only when needed for understanding
by the trier of fact. Under the value
test, lay opinion is admissible if it is
helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony and the testimony
of an expert is admissible if it will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence.
Although the difference is to some
extent one of semantics, the value test
encourages significantly greater ad-
missibility. The Michigan cases have
tended in that direction; but to the ex-
tent that there has been doubt in the
cases, MRE 701 and 702 resolve it by
adopting the value test.
The significant provision in MRE
703, dealing with bases of opinion tes-
timony by experts, is that the facts or
data on which an expert bases an opin-
ion need not be admissible in evidence
"if of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the
subject." Although there is some sup-
porting Michigan authority for this
proposition, it appears to be inconsis-
tent with the majority of Michigan
cases.
MRE 704 provides that opinion tes-
timony is not objectionable merely be-
cause it "embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." The
rule is consistent with prior Michigan
law as to testimony of experts, but it is
not clear that Michigan has permitted
lay opinions on ultimate issues. In any
event, the new rule permits such opin-
ions if they are otherwise admissible
("helpful," among other things).
MRE 705 permits the expert to give
an opinion and the reason therefor
without prior disclosure of the un-
derlying facts, these being left to
cross-examination, unless the court
requires otherwise. This accords with
prior Michigan practice.
MRE 706 authorizes and provides
procedural rules governing court-
appointed experts, a practice not pro-
vided for in prior Michigan law. Of
primary interest are the provisions
authorizing the court in its discretion
to disclose to the jury the fact that the
court appointed the witness, and per-
mitting the parties to call expert wit-
nesses of their own choice.
Article VIII
Hearsay
Article VIII of the proposed Michi-
gan Rules of Evidence deals with the
hearsay rule and is substantially iden-
tical with Article VIII of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The sole exception
is that MRE 801(d)(1)(A), which gov-
erns the admissibility of prior incon-
sistent statements of witnesses, is
identical with the United States Su-
preme Court version of Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(A) rather than the version
subsequently adopted by Congress.
MRE 801(a),(b) and (c) contain the
definitial elements of the hearsay rule.
The definition of hearsay in MRE
801(c) is consistent with prior Michi-
gan law:
'Hearsay' is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while tes-
tifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."
MRE 801(a) defines a "statement"
for purposes of the hearsay rule to
exclude statements or conduct not in-
tended as an assertion. Accordingly, it
is consistent with the Supreme Court's
recent decision in People v Stewart,
397 Mich 1, 9-10 (1976).
MRE 801(d)(1) governs the admis-
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sibility of certain prior statements of
witnesses. MRE 801(d)(1)(A) provides
that "[a] statement is not hearsay if
-.. [t]he declarant testifies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement
and the statement is ... inconsistent
with his testimony ... " MRE 801(d)
(1)(A) differs from the counterpart
Federal Rule which requires that the
statement must also have been "given
under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, hearing or other
proceeding, or in a deposition ..."
MRE 801(d)(1)(A) is inconsistent with
prior Michigan law which limits the
admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements to the purpose of impeach-
ing credibility and prohibits their use
as substantive evidence.
For the policy arguments supporting
these alternative rules, see the Advi-
sory Committee Note and legislative
history regarding Federal Rule 801
(d)(1)(A).
MRE 801(d)(1)(B) is inconsistent
with prior Michigan law in admitting
as substantive evidence (as well as for
rehabilitation of credibility) prior con-
sistent statements of a witness "to
rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive ..."
Michigan courts have admitted prior
consistent statements for these pur-
poses, but only on the issue of credibil-
ity and not as substantive evidence.
MRE 801(d)(1)(C) is consistent with
prior Michigan law in admitting the
testimony of a witness as to his own
prior identification of a person made
after perceiving him. The only differ-
ence between MRE 801(d)(1)(C) and
prior Michigan law is that Michigan
has previously treated statements of
prior identification as an exception to
the hearsay rule, while MRE 801(d)
(1)(C) provides that such statements
are not hearsay at all.
MRE 801(d)(2) governs the admis-
sibility of certain admissions by a
party-opponent. Prior Michigan law
treated party admissions under an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, while
MRE 801(d)(2) provides that they are
not hearsay at all. MRE 801(d)(2)(A)
is consistent with prior Michigan law
in admitting statements of a party
against the party. Under MRE 801
(d)(2)(A) a guilty plea by a party
would be admissible against him in a
subsequent civil action arising out of
the same occurrence.
To this extent MRE 801(d)(2)(A) is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Wheelock v Eyl, 393
Mich 74, 79 (1974), in which the Court
stated that: "A criminal conviction
after trial, or plea, or payment of a
fine is not admissible as substantive
evidence of conduct at issue in a civil
case arising out of the same occur-
rence." Wheelock involved the admis-
sibility of payment of a traffic ticket in
a subsequent automobile negligence
case arising out of the same occur-
rence. Certain dicta in the case have
been criticized:
"The Michigan Supreme Court, al-
though reaching the correct result on
the Wheelock facts of payment of a
traffic fine, appears to have gone be-
yond merely excluding guilty pleas
to minor traffic violations and to
have fashioned a rule that also ex-
cludes guilty pleas to more serious
violations. This expansion of the
holding to situations beyond those at
issue seems unnecessary as well as
unwise. The probative value of ad-
missions against interest, though
minimal when pleas to minor viola-
tions are involved, is much greater
when the plea is to a major offense."
Note, 24 Kansas L Rev 193, 202 (1975).
See also Robinson, Civil and Criminal
Evidence, 1975 Ann Survey of Mich
Law, 22 Wayne L Rev 447, 471-72
(1976).
If the Supreme Court is inclined to
retain the Wheelock rule, at least as to
misdemeanors, it could do so by the
addition of a Rule 412 to the MRE
which could read as follows:
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"Evidence that a person has been
convicted of a crime after trial, or
plea or payment of a fine is not ad-
missible as substantive evidence of
conduct at issue in a civil case aris-
ing out of the same occurrence, un-
less the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which
he was convicted."
If the Court wishes to retain the
Wheelock rule as to all crimes, includ-
ing felonies, the foregoing Rule 412
could be adopted with the deletion of
the language "unless the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law
under which he was convicted."
MRE 801(d)(2)(B) is consistent with
prior Michigan law in admitting adop-
tive admissions of a party. To the ex-
tent MRE 801(d)(2)(B) could au-
thorize admission of a noncustodial
admission by silence of an accused in
the face of an accusation, it appears to
conflict with People v Bobo, 390 Mich
355 (1973), which held that an ac-
cused's silence cannot be admitted
against him. See Robinson, Civil and
Criminal Evidence, 1974 Ann Survey
of Mich Law, 21 Wayne L Rev 437,
476-478 (1975).
Bobo, however, was decided on con-
stitutional rather than evidence
grounds and thus MRE 801(d)(2)(B)
would not directly conflict with Bobo
since no effort has been made in the
proposed Michigan rules to codify
rules excluding evidence on constitu-
tional grounds.
MRE 801(d)(2)(C) is consistent with
prior Michigan law in authorizing
admission of statements by a person
authorized by a party to make a
statement concerning the subject.
MRE 801(d)(2)(D) authorizes ad-
mission of a statement by the em-
ployee or agent of a party "concerning
a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment made during
the existence of the relationship."
Prior Michigan law has been more re-
strictive, requiring preliminary proof
that the employee or agent had au-
thority from his principal to make the
statement involved.
MRE 801(d)(2)(E) is consistent with
Michigan law in authorizing admis-
sion of "a statement by a co-conspir-
ator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy."
MRE 802 simply provides that:
"Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by these rules." This rule is
consistent with current Michigan law
to the extent that hearsay is not ad-
missible unless it falls within one of
the recognized exceptions to the hear-
say rule.
MRE 803 governs exceptions to the
hearsay rule where the availability of
the declarant is immaterial to admis-
sibility. Most of the MRE 803 hearsay
exceptions are generally consistent
with prior Michigan law. See, e.g.:
1. MRE 803(2) (Excited utterance);
2. MRE 803(3) (Then existing men-
tal, emotion or physical condi-
tion);
3. MRE 803(5) (Recorded recollec-
tion);
4. MRE 803(9) (Records of vital
statistics);
5. MRE 803(11) (Records of religi-
ous organizations);
6. MRE 803(12) (Marriage, baptis-
mal, and similar certificates);
7. MRE 803(13) (Family records);
8. MRE 803(14) (Records of docu-
ments affecting an interest in
property);
9. MRE 803(16) (Statements in an-
cient documents);
10. MRE 803(17) (Market reports,
commercial publications);
11. MRE 803(18) (Learned treatises);
12. MRE 803(19) (Reputation con-
cerning personal or family his-
tory);
13. MRE 803(20) (Reputation con-
MICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL JANUARY, 1977
cerning boundaries or general
history); and
14. MRE 803(21) (Reputation as to
character).
The MRE 803 hearsay exceptions
which depart significantly from prior
Michigan law are as follows:
1. MRE 803(1) admits statements
describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition,
or immediately thereafter. No prior
Michigan authority specifically recog-
nizes an exception for such state-
ments; however, the admission of such
statements may have been justified by
Michigan courts from time to time in
the past under the so-called "res ges-
tae" exception to the hearsay rule.
2. MRE 803(4) admits certain
statements made for purposes of medi-
cal diagnoses or treatment, including
statements describing medical history,
past or present symptoms, etc. While
prior Michigan law admitted decla-
rations of present physical or mental
condition (unless made to a physician
seen for purposes of litigation), prior
Michigan law did not generally admit
other types of statements (e.g., medical
histories) simply because they were
made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment.
3. MRE 803(6) admits certain busi-
ness records and MRE 803(7) permits
proof of the nonoccurence or nonexist-
ence of certain matters by showing the
absence of an entry in business rec-
ords. These rules are generally con-
sistent with MCLA 600.2146, the
business records statute. The major
difference between MRE 803(6) and
prior Michigan law is that under
MRE 803(6) statements of opinions or
diagnoses contained in business rec-
ords may also be admissible in appro-
priate circumstances. Such statements
have not generally been admissible
under prior Michigan law.
4. MRE 803(8) admits certain pub-
lic records and reports to prove mat-
ters recorded therein. MRE 803(10)
permits proof of the absence of a public
record or the nonoccurrence or nonex-
istence of certain matters which would
have been recorded in a public record,
by showing the absence of the applica-
ble public record through testimony or
a certificate from an authorized custo-
dian of the records. These rules are
generally consistent with prior Michi-
gan law; however, MRE 803(8)(C) is
inconsistent in authorizing admission
of certain evaluative reports contain-
ing factual findings in civil cases and
against the government in criminal
cases "unless the sources of informa-
tion or other circumstances clearly in-
dicate lack of trustworthiness."
5. MRE 803(15) admits relevant
statements in documents affecting an
interest in property under certain cir-
cumstances. No prior Michigan au-
thority was located authorizing admis-
sion or requiring exclusion of such
evidence.
6. MRE 803(22) admits evidence of
felony judgments to prove "any fact
essential to sustain the judgment";
however, in criminal cases the gov-
ernment cannot offer criminal judg-
ments against persons other than the
accused except as may be permitted
for impeachment. This rule is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Wheelock v Eyl, 393
Mich 74, 79 (1974), to the extent that
MRE 803(22) would authorize proof of
a felony conviction (by trial or plea) in
a subsequent civil action arising out of
the same occurrence. In Wheelock the
Court held "that a criminal conviction
after trial or plea, or payment of a fine
is not admissible as substantive evi-
dence of conduct at issue in a civil case
arising out of the same occurrence."
7. MRE 803(23) authorizes admis-
sion of certain judgments as to per-
sonal, family or general history, or
boundaries if the same would be prov-
able by reputation evidence. No prior
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Michigan authority was located au-
thorizing admission or requiring ex-
clusion of such evidence.
MRE 804 governs exceptions to the
hearsay rule where the unavailability
of the declarant is a condition of ad-
missibility. The various tests of un-
availability under MRE 804(a) (e.g.,
excused by privilege, persistent re-
fusal to testify despite court order,
lack of memory, death or disability,
absence from jurisdiction) are gener-
ally consistent with prior Michigan
law.
The MRE 804 hearsay exceptions
are generally consistent with prior
Michigan law; however, they all have
some variations:
1. MRE 804(b)(1) admits the for-
mer testimony of an unavailable de-
clarant if the party against whom the
testimony is presently offered (includ-
ing a predecessor in interest in a civil
case) "had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by di-
rect, cross, or redirect examination."
This rule is consistent with prior
Michigan law except that: a) former
testimony from a different proceeding
is not admissible in Michigan against
the accused in criminal cases; and
b) no Michigan authority was located
authorizing admission of former tes-
timony against a "predecessor in
interest." Since the Michigan criminal
cases excluding former testimony from
a different proceeding are based upon
constitutional grounds of confronta-
tion rather than evidence grounds,
adoption of MRE 804(b)(1) would not
necessarily change Michigan law.
2. MRE 804(b)(2) authorizes ad-
mission of statements made under be-
lief of impending death (i.e., dying dec-
larations). Unlike prior Michigan law,
however, the statements may be ad-
mitted in civil cases as well as homi-
cide cases and the declarant need not
have died, so long as belief of immi-
nent death existed when the state-
ment was made and the declarant is
unavailable at trial.
3. MRE 804(b)(3) authorizes ad-
mission of statements against interest,
including statements against penal
interest as well as pecuniary and
proprietary interest. Prior Michigan
law is in accord, except that the Su-
preme Court in People v Edwards, 396
Mich 551 (1976) recently rejected the
requirement found in MRE 804(b)(3)
that: "A statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating cir-
cumstances clearly indicate the trust-
worthiness of the statements." If the
court wishes to retain the holding in
Edwards rejecting the corroboration
requirement, it can do so easily by de-
leting the foregoing sentence from
MRE 804(b)(3).
4. MRE 804(b)(4) is generally con-
sistent with prior Michigan law in
recognizing a hearsay exception for
statements of personal and family his-
tory by unavailable declarants. This
exception is sometimes called the
"pedigree exception." However, MRE
804(b)(4) is inconsistent with prior
Michigan law: a) in rejecting the re-
quirement that the statements be
made when there was no motive to fal-
sify (i.e., "ante litem motam"), and
b) in rejecting the requirement that
the declarant be related by blood or
marriage to the person of whose pedi-
gree he speaks. MRE 804(b)(4) re-
quires only "intimate association."
Both MRE 803 and MRE 804 con-
tain so-called residual hearsay excep-
tions. Under MRE 803(24) and 804
(b)(5), hearsay statements which fall
within none of the specific exceptions
may nevertheless be admitted, pro-
vided that they have "equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" and if they meet certain other
specific requirements, including pre-
trial notice of intent to offer the evi-
dence. The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, speaking of the identical federal
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counterparts to MRE 803(24) and
804(b)(5) said:
"It is intended that the residual
hearsay exceptions will be used very
rarely, and only in exceptional cir-
cumstances. The committee does not
intend to establish a broad license
for trial judges to admit hearsay
statements which do not fall within
one of the other exceptions con-
tained in 803 and 804(b)."
MRE 805 is consistent with prior
Michigan law in authorizing admis-
sion of hearsay within hearsay "if each
part of the combined statements con-
forms with an exception to the hearsay
rule provided in these rules."
MRE 806 permits the credibility of
a hearsay declarant to be attacked like
any other witness and specifically re-
jects the requirement of prior Michi-
gan law that before extrinsic evidence
of the declarant's inconsistent state-
ments may be offered (even to impeach
an unavailable hearsay declarant), the
declarant must have been afforded an




The three rules in Article IX list the
traditional means of identifying or es-
tablishing the authenticity of docu-
ments, telephone conversations, data
compilations, and the like. Except for
minor adjustments to make the lan-
guage appropriate to state circum-
stance, the rules are drawn from the
Federal Rules of Evidence and are
generally consistent with prior Michi-
gan law.
Rule 901 states that the require-
ment of authentication or identifica-
tion is satisfied "by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims."
The rule then gives, "by way of illus-
tration only, and not by way of limita-
tion," examples of authentication con-
forming with the requirements of the
rule, such as testimony by a witness
with knowledge, circumstantial au-
thentication, ancient documents (here
twenty years, rather than the thirty
required in prior Michigan law), or
any method "provided by the Supreme
Court of Michigan or by a Michigan
statute." MRE 902 recognizes some
writings, mostly public, as authentic
without extrinsic evidence. Among
these self-authenticating items are
certain domestic and foreign public
documents, certified copies of public
records, newspapers and periodicals,
trade inscriptions, acknowledged doc-
uments, and the like. (It should be
noted that MRE 901 and MRE 902 do
not satisfy other possible objections,
such as hearsay, but satisfy only the
requirement of authentication as a
condition precedent to admissibility.)
MRE 903 excuses the production of
a subscribing witness unless by law
the validity of the instrument is condi-




What lawyers often call the "best
evidence rule" is the subject of Article
X. The eight rules in this Article,
though generally consistent with prior
Michigan practice, provide both
clarification and accommodation to
contemporary modes of recording, stor-
ing, and copying information.
MRE 1002 employs traditional
terms to state the basic rule:
"To prove the content of a writing,
recording, or photograph, the origi-
nal writing, recording, or photo-
graph is required, except as other-
wise provided in these rules or stat-
ute."
MRE 1001, however, defining the
terms used in Article X, creates the
concept of a "duplicate," which is:
"a counterpart produced by the
same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by means of
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photography, including enlarge-
ments and miniatures, or by mechan-
ical or electronic re-recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques, which accu-
rately reproduces the original."
Then, MRE 1003 makes duplicate
admissible
"to the same extent as an original un-
less (1) a genuine question is raised
as to the authenticity of the original
or (2) in the circumstances it would
be unfair to admit the duplicate in
lieu of the original."
This patently useful procedure has
not heretofore been available in Mich-
igan except for certain business rec-
ords, and even there with substantial
restrictions. See MCLA 600.2146-8.
As in prior Michigan practice, MRE
1004 excuses production of the origi-
nal if the original is lost or destroyed,
cannot be obtained by judicial process,
is in possession of the opponent and
the opponent is on notice that the orig-
inal will be needed at the hearing, or
relates to a collateral matter. If the
original is thus excused the proponent
may offer any other evidence of con-
tents, there being no "degrees" of sec-
ondary evidence recognized. Prior
Michigan law was unclear on this
matter.
Baroda State Bank v Peck, 235 Mich
542 (1926), is often cited as authority
for the proposition that Michigan rec-
ognizes no degrees of secondary evi-
dence. In fact, however, the Baroda
opinion was divided 4-4, thus affirm-
ing a trial court ruling that there are
degrees of secondary evidence. MRE
1004's resolution of the issue may or
may not have changed Michigan law.
By the terms of MRE 1006, certified
or compared copies of public records
are admissible, as in prior Michigan
practice.
Summaries of voluminous writings,
recordings, and the like, which cannot
be conveniently examined in court,
may be presented in the form of a
chart, summary, or calculation, under
the provisions of MRE 1006. The orig-
inals or "duplicates" must be made
available for examination or copying
by other parties, and the judge may
order that they be produced in court.
MRE 1007 provides yet two more
ways to establish the contents of doc-
uments: by the testimony or deposition
of the party against whom offered or
by his written admission. An extraju-
dicial oral admission will not suffice.
MRE 1008 is a particularized ref-
erence to functions of judge and jury
in dealing with questions of fact pre-
liminary to determinations of admis-
sibility, more generally dealt with in
MRE 104. Here, as in MRE 104, the
question of whether the condition of
fact rendering secondary evidence ad-
missible has been fulfilled (e.g.,
whether the original has been lost) is
left to the judge. But MRE 1008
leaves the "preliminary question" to
the jury when an issue is raised
"(a) whether the asserted writing
ever existed, or (b) whether another
writing ... produced at the trial is
the original, or (c) whether other evi-
dence of contents correctly reflects
the contents .... "
In all of these particulars, there is




MRE 1101, derived from the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence (1974) be-
cause more appropriate to state prac-
tice than the federal counterpart,
makes the Michigan Rules of Evidence
inapplicable, as mentioned in the dis-
cussion of MRE 101, supra, to pre-
liminary questions of fact, grand jury
proceedings, miscellaneous proceed-
ings, and summary contempt proceed-
ings. The rule's only departure from
the Uniform Rule lies in omission of
an exception for preliminary examina-
tions, thus making the Michigan
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Rules of Evidence applicable to pre-
liminary examinations, as in prior
Michigan practice. See People v
Walker 385 Mich 565 (1971); People v
Domin, 71 Mich App 315 (1976).
Rule 1102 authorizes citation of the
rules as MRE - a practice to which
any reader of this article is by now ac-
customed.
CONCLUSION
As can be discerned from the forego-
ing, in most instances the proposed
Michigan Rules of Evidence are con-
sistent with prior Michigan law. Those
proposed rules which differ from prior
Michigan law involve changes which
are logical extensions of established
evidence principles and are consistent
with the trend of authority in the
United States and the example set by
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
changes, in other words, are evolution-
ary rather than revolutionary.
Current Michigan evidence law
must be culled, often with great diffi-
culty, from Supreme Court decisions
(often outdated), Court of Appeals de-
cisions (sometimes conflicting), stat-
utes and court rules. The adoption of
the proposed Michigan Rules of Evi-
dence will not, of course, end all prob-
lems in the law of evidence. If the
rules are adopted, however, everyone
will start from the same source and
that source will be convenient for im-
mediate reference during trial.
Michigan is fortunate to have had
the Federal Rules of Evidence availa-
ble as a model for the proposed Michi-
gan evidence rules. The Federal Rules
were the product of over thirteen years
of study and debate by eminent judges,
lawyers, law professors and members
of Congress.
Adoption of the proposed Michigan
Rules of Evidence by the Supreme
Court will: 1) provide Michigan judges
and lawyers with an authoritative
statement of evidence law which will
be easy to use and convenient for im-
mediate reference; 2) allow Michigan
judges and lawyers to benefit from de-
veloping precedents from the federal
courts and other states interpreting
nearly identical rules; and 3) prevent
the confusion and injustice which
could result from one set of evidence
rules for federal courts in Michigan
and another set of rules for Michigan
state courts.
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